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Abstract
After a prolonged period characterized by rapid real appreciation in house prices, there is now broad
recognition of the severe correction in housing markets that followed as one of the causes of the 2008-
09 global recession. We investigate the time series characteristics of three relevant price indicators of
the housing market real house prices, price-to-income, and price-to-rent ratios for the U.S. and 21
other countries during the period 1975Q1-2013Q2 (see Mack and Martínez-García (2011)) for evidence
of explosive behavior as a plausible explanation for the boom and bust. The empirical detection of
explosive behavior in house prices provides a precise timeline as well as empirical content to the narrative
connecting the evolution of housing markets to the global recession; our rich cross-country dataset o¤ers a
novel international perspective. For testing and detection, we adopt a pair of novel techniques based on a
right-tail variation of the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF ) test the supremum ADF (SADF )
(Phillips et al. (2011)) and the generalized SADF (GSADF ) (Phillips et al. (2012) and Phillips et al.
(2013)) where the alternative hypothesis is of a mildly explosive process (even periodically collapsing
with the GSADF test) behavior within sample. Statistically signicant periods of exuberance are found
in most countries, with our empirical estimates suggesting an unprecendented synchronization across
countries preceeding the global recession. The boom in housing begins during the late 90s in the U.S.
spreading to most countries by the early 2000s, until it bursts for most during 2007  08 as the impact
on economic activity was being felt. In this regard, our ndings corroborate the narrative of the 2008-09
global recession. In this paper, we also discuss more generally the use of these procedures to monitor
international housing markets and as a warning signal.
JEL Classication : C22, G12, R30, R31
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1 Introduction
The latest boom and bust in international housing markets has generated an increased interest in the
dynamics of house prices. The policy concerns on housing are related to the e¤ectiveness of scal, monetary
and regulatory policies to restore nancial stability after the collapse of house prices. While the consequences
of the housing correction are still being felt, shedding light on the emergence and evolution of the period of
exuberance that preceded the 2008-09 global recession can improve our understanding of the housing market
and is of great importance to policy-making. Explosive behavior in house prices can give rise to such boom
periods which, in turn, can lead to a misallocation of resources, distort investment patterns, and have serious
repercussions in real economic activity. The depth and complexity of the 2008-09 global recession is such,
that exploring its root causes in the housing market, and even mapping its timeline, has been anything but
straightforward. Our paper provides a unique look at the evolution of housing markets in the U.S. and
internationally.
We examine empirically the performance of international housing markets since the housing market
correction is viewed as one of the factors leading to the 2008-09 global recession to elicit and document
the facts, and explore their interconnectedness. To achieve this, we use data from the International House
Price Database of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (Mack and Martínez-García (2011)) as it o¤ers a
comprehensive and comparable panel from the rst quarter of 1975 to the second quarter of 2013 for the
U.S. and 21 other countries. We focus on periods of housing exuberance in the testing and detection of
explosive autoregressive behavior in real house prices and house price to income ratios found in this dataset.
The evidence of exuberance in housing markets understood as mildly explosive behavior that we detect
and identify is compatible with several di¤erent explanations. Di¤erent propagating mechanisms can lead to
explosive characteristics in the data, the most prominent of which are perhaps models with rational bubbles
(see, e.g., Blanchard (1979) and Blanchard and Watson (1982)). In that sense, our motivation and work
is related to the rational bubbles literature and the large body of empirical studies on rational bubbles
that followed but we refrain from using the term bubbles in connection with our ndings because bubble-
detection requires the specication and estimation of an economic model for the housing market which is
something that we do not attempt here (see, e.g., Himmelberg et al. (2005)).
Time series methods that can detect and date periods of explosive behavior are particularly relevant for
our empirical analysis, but standard unit root and cointegration tests have di¢ culties detecting such behavior.
Flood and Hodrick (1990), Gürkaynak (2008) and Homm and Breitung (2012) survey existing econometric
methodologies and their ndings. For testing and date-stamping the origination and termination of periods
of exuberance, we implement a novel econometric procedure and mildly explosive regression asymptotics to
data on real house prices as well as house price to economic fundamental ratios namely the house price to
income ratio.
In a recent series of papers, Phillips et al. (2011) propose a new recursive exible-window testing pro-
cedure for identifying periods of mild explosiveness (supremum ADF, SADF ) and Phillips et al. (2012)
and Phillips et al. (2013) extend it for time series that display periodically collapsing behavior (General-
ized SADF, GSADF ). The detection strategy employed is based on a right-tail variation of the standard
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test where the alternative hypothesis is of a mildly explosive process.1
1Mildly explosive behavior is modeled by an autoregressive process with a root that exceeds unity, but remains within the
vicinity of one. This represents a small departure from martingale behavior, but is consistent with the submartingale property
1
Rejection of the null with the SADF and GSADF tests provides empirical evidence of explosive behavior
within sample, but also enables us in a subsequent step to date-stamp its occurrence.2 These tests better
detect explosive behavior in time series data than standard methods such as unit root/cointegration tests
(e.g., Diba and Grossman (1988)), but also variance bound tests (e.g., LeRoy and Porter (1981), Shiller
(1981)), specication tests (e.g., West (1987)), and Chow and CUSUM-type tests (e.g., Homm and Breitung
(2012)).
A number of recent studies have implemented similar time series techniques in the context of housing
markets. For example, Phillips and Yu (2011) use the SADF test to date stamp bubbles in the U.S. housing
market, corporate bond spreads and oil prices, during the crisis. Yiu et al. (2013) document multiple
episodes of exuberance in the Hong Kong housing market using the GSADF test. Our work complements
theirs, but contributes to the existing literature by exposing the characteristics of the last boom and bust
episode in international housing markets.
Our ndings indicate that the period of exuberance that started in the U.S. and Ireland in the late
1990s, became rapidly widespread across countries in the early 2000s, and continued until sometime in 2008
preceding the 2008-09 global recession. This pattern of near-simultaneous explosive behavior across multiple
countries, whose emergence cuts across signicant di¤erences in their domestic housing markets and the
non-tradability of housing, has no precedent in our sample since the 1970s. The complex nancial linkages
and greater economic integration during this period may have facilitated the propagation, and perhaps
amplied the potential consequences of the housing collapse that followed. While the precise mechanism
still remains the source of much academic and professional debate, failing to recognize the emergence of
exuberance episodes can have devastating implications. In that regard, it is worth noting that the empirical
identication of explosive behavior in real time for surveillance and monitoring, and even the documentation
of a timeline, can be greatly aided by these techniques.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines the standard asset pricing equation
on housing and describes how explosive behavior in house prices may arise. In section 3 we provide extensive
discussion and further details on the SADF (Phillips et al. (2011)) and GSADF test procedures (Phillips
et al. (2012) and Phillips et al. (2013)) that we implement with the data from the International House Price
Database of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Then we present novel quantitative ndings in section
4 based on the implementation of these tests and date-stamping procedures across multiple international
housing markets. We also note the strong synchronization of periods of explosive behavior in the last boom
and bust episode across all countries covered in the International House Price Database. Section 5 provides
some additional discussion and concludes.
often used in the rational bubbles literature (see section 2 for further details). Phillips and Magdalinos (2007) and ?) provide
a large sample asymptotic theory for this class of processes that enables econometric inference in this case, unlike for purely
explosive processes.
2Since the second quarter of 2013, the Federal Reserve Bank of DallasInternational House Price Database in partnership
with the Department of Economics at Lancaster University Management School publishes indicators of exuberance in real house
prices and house-prices-to-income ratios based on the SADF and GSADF methodologies.
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2 House Price: Models and Specication
One conventional framework for the study of exuberance in asset prices is provided by the rational bubbles
literature, as it is well-known that the presence of bubbles can result in explosive behavior. The main take-
away from this strand of the literature is that the existence of a bubble in an asset price in house prices in
our case should manifest in the dynamic and stochastic properties of the observed price of housing, therefore
allowing statistical inference to detect the bubble. More generally, episodes of mildly explosive behavior in
house prices whether derived from the formation and collapse of a rational bubble or due to other factors
such as behavioral biases, pricing errors, etc. should be similarly amenable to statistical testing with the
observed data on house prices. Our empirical strategy aims to detect mildly explosive behavior in the data
from its time series properties.
Based on asset pricing theory, the price of housing in equilibrium can be derived from the following
no-arbitrage condition under the assumption of risk neutrality,
r|{z}
constant risk-free rate
= Et (Rt)| {z }
expected return on housing
; (1)
where r > 0 is the discount rate, the expectations operator Et is based on all information available up to
time t, and the return on housing at time t+ 1 is dened as,
Rt  Pt+1 + Ft+1
Pt
  1: (2)
Pt denotes the house price at time t, and Ft is the stream of payo¤s (pecuniary or otherwise) derived from
housing at time t.
We equate the discount rate r > 0 that is, the expected (net) return on an alternative investment
opportunity with the constant risk-free rate rt such that Et (rt) = r for all t. We will consider later on
discount rates that vary over time, as those variations can also contribute to propagate explosive behavior in
house prices. We refer to Ft as the economic fundamentals of the housing market, and work out our analysis
with the help of two related specications:
A general specication of Ft includes the payo¤ stream Xt that is given by the economic rents of housing,
including housing services, but recognizes the possibility of unobserved fundamentals Ut driving the price of
housing, i.e.,
Ft = Xt + Ut: (3)
where fUtg1t=1 represents a stream of fundamental factors driving the price of housing that are otherwise
unobservable.
An alternative specication of Ft relates the payo¤ stream of housing rents to macroeconomic fundamen-
tals through the demand equation for rental housing. Under additional constraints on preferences, we can
derive a linear expenditure system where the demand for rental housing linearly relates housing rents Xt to
macroeconomic fundamentals such as disposable income Yt, i.e.,
Ft =  + Yt + Ut: (4)
3
Appendix A provides details on the derivation of this relationship that is meant to capture the a¤ordability
determinants of housing.3
Replacing the denition of the return on housing Rt in (2) and re-arranging the no-arbitrage condition




Et [Pt+1 + Ft+1] ; (5)
which indicates that the price today must be equal to the discounted present-value of the expected funda-
mentals plus the re-sale price of housing tomorrow. Recursive substitution of this asset pricing equation
yields the standard present value model for the price of housing (see, e.g., Clayton (1996)).
Solving equation (5) recursively T periods forward, we obtain an expression for the house price as a
function of the expected discounted ow of all future payo¤s up to time T plus a terminal condition that






























the (unique) no-bubbles solution to the expectational di¤erence equation that characterizes house prices in
(5) yields,










where P t is referred to as the fundamental value of housing.
Equation (8) indicates that, when housing is treated as an investment (or asset), the value of housing
should be equal to the present discounted value of all future economic rents that it generates as captured
by the economic fundamentals. In other words, the factors that determine the price are the expected
fundamentals Et [Ft+i] for all i  1 and the discount rate r. For further details on the present value model,
see Gordon and Shapiro (1956) for the standard dividend discount model assuming the payo¤ stream
fXtg1t=1 grows at a constant rate. Blanchard and Watson (1982) and Campbell et al. (1997) discuss the
present value model in the context of more general processes for fXtg1t=1.
Imposing the transversality condition in (7) rules out non-fundamental behavior (bubbles), and this
implies that the housing price corresponds to its fundamental value (i.e., Pt = P t ). Explosive behavior can
still be inherited by the house price through its fundamental price P t , if the observable fundamentals such as
3As housing rents are di¢ cult to measure in the data, we often use the a¢ ne transformation implied by the demand equation
for rental housing to relate house prices to personal income. In doing so, however, the denition of fundamentals has to be
augmented with a particular specication of the rental housing demand which may a¤ect the inferences we draw from the
analysis.
4Log-linear approximations of this equation see, e.g., Campbell and Shiller (1989) and Chapter 7 in Campbell et al.
(1997) are commonly used, but may be less relevant with nonstationary data where sample means do not converge to
population constants. Further discussion on these approximations can be found in Lee and Phillips (2011). In this paper, we
discuss the theory and report our applied work in levels, but we nd very similar results in log levels.
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housing rents fXtg1t=1 or disposable income fYtg1t=1 display such behavior. Unobserved fundamentals not
directly reected in the measures of housing rents fUtg1t=1 can also be driving the behavior of house prices.
Explosive behavior can also arise from time-variation in the discount rate r, as indicated before.
Without imposing the transversality condition in (7), the forward solution to the expectational di¤erence
equation for the price of housing Pt given in (5) is no longer unique (see, e.g., Sargent (1987), Diba and
Grossman (1988) and LeRoy (2004)). It includes the fundamental price determined in (8) that is, the
no-bubbles solution P t to the asset pricing model plus a non-stationary component in the following form,
Pt = P

t + (1 + r)
t
ct; (9)
where fctg1t=1 is a martingale that is, a stochastic process that satises Etct+1 = ct. If the non-stationary
(or bubble) component cannot be ruled out, it introduces explosive behavior that a¤ects the time series of
house prices even when economic fundamentals are not explosive themselves. Moreover, there are innitely
many solutions of the form presented in (9) that solve equation (5).
We can re-dene the non-stationary component of the solution in (9) as Bt = (1 + r)
t
ct. With this
characterization, the rational bubble, Bt, can simply be expressed as the di¤erence between the housing
price, Pt, and its fundamental-based value, P t , i.e.,
Bt = Pt   P t : (10)
The bubble component Bt shows mildly explosive behavior since it satises the submartingale property,
Et (Bt+1) = (1 + r)Bt; (11)
given that the underlying component ct follows a martingale process and the discount factor satises that
r > 0. Making the discount factor rt > 0 either stationary or integrated of order 1 is not going to alter the
implications of the submartingale in (11), implying an explosive process for Bt even if Ft is not explosive
(see, e.g., Phillips and Yu (2011) on this point).
With this framework, we dene rational bubbles in house prices, Bt, as departures from the fundamental
value of housing. If Bt = 0, there is no rational bubble and prices are determined only by the expected
future discounted fundamentals of housing. In turn, if Bt 6= 0 there is a bubble that induces explosiveness
into the time series of house prices Pt. If house prices include a non-stationary (bubble) component Bt
that satises condition (11), then it is because investors operating in the housing market are expecting the
non-fundamental component of the price of housing (the bubble) to keep growing at a rate that equals the
discount rate r > 0. The theory of rational bubbles under the expectational di¤erence equation in (5) can
be understood from that logic.
For simplicity, let us assume that Bt is strictly positive in order to illustrate the rational bubbles
argument. An investor is willing to pay today Bt > 0 units more than its fundamental value P t for a house
only if he expects to be su¢ ciently compensated through future price increases (rather than through future
housing rent increases) for the higher payment he is making today. If enough investors share the same belief
about house price appreciation, then they will buy the houses driving their price up. In turn, this conrms
the expectation of future price increases that had been anticipated by the investors sustaining the bubble
for a period in what is referred to as a self-fullling prophecy.
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2.1 Non-Fundamental Rational Bubbles
Adopting the representation proposed by Campbell and Shiller (1987) for the fundamental value of housing
P t and replacing it into the asset pricing model solution including non-fundamental behavior (bubbles) in


















where  is the di¤erence operator (i.e., Ft = Ft Ft 1). If a (non-fundamental) rational bubble is a large
part of the total price of housing, the price itself would become disconnected from the fundamentals of the
housing market in ways that can be exploited for statistical inference. Therefore, a natural path to follow
is to test for the possibility of such a disconnect by seeking evidence of explosive behavior in the observed
house price series directly.
To illustrate the disconnect that arises between housing prices and fundamentals in the presence of a (non-
fundamental) rational bubble we must specify the stochastic process for the fundamentals Ft. A plausible
assumption would be that the economic rents on housing, Ft, follows either a stationary or integrated of
order 1 (i.e., I (1)) process, i.e.,





where t is white noise. The stochastic process in (13) is stationary if jj < 1, and becomes I (1) with a unit
root whenever  = 1. The I (1) process is said to be a random walk with drift. In the absence of bubbles
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The house price Pt is either stationary or has a unit root depending on the specication of the fundamentals
Ft. The house price Pt is also cointegrated with Ft such that Pt 







rFt is stationary. In
other words, house prices and fundamentals housing rents should be driven by either the same stationary
autorregressive process of order 1 or by the same integrated process of order 1 (i.e., I (1)) if Bt = 0 for all t.
Diba and Grossman (1988) observe that fundamental asset prices the fundamental house price P t in
our context are integrated of the same order as the fundamental process Ft in the absence of bubbles (as
illustrated for the I (1) case here). In the presence of a bubble (i.e., Bt 6= 0), the house price in (10) contains
the explosive root from Bt and so does the linear combination Pt   1rFt in (12). This di¤erentiates the
fundamental value P t from the bubble process Bt underlying the house price Pt, as the stochastic process
for the fundamental value is inherited from the stochastic process for the fundamentals while the (non-
fundamental) rational bubble component is characterized by an explosive autoregressive process implied by
the submartingale condition (11) instead.
Hence, if house prices Pt and fundamentals Ft are integrated of the same order (i.e., I (1)) or stationary
with the same autorregressive order, then we could exclude the presence of non-fundamental rational bubbles
in the data. More generally, if house prices exhibit explosive autoregressive behavior or shifts from I (1) to
5For a discussion of a more general solution with log-linear approximation methods, see the work of Engsted et al. (2012).
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mildly explosive behavior such as the one characterized by the submartingale property in (11), then we could
argue that house prices have become disconnected from I (1) fundamentals. When the process for house
prices loses its explosiveness, then we expect house prices to be again aligned with that characteristics of the
process driving the fundamentals then we could claim that the episode of exuberance has ended.
2.2 Explosive Behavior and Fundamentals
In this paper we use a recursive procedure based on the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test which allows
for the testing, ex post identication and date stamping of mildly explosive behavior in economic time series.
This econometric method has been developed in a series of papers by Phillips et al. (2011), Phillips et al.
(2012) and Phillips et al. (2013) with tests that deal with the structural change from a random walk (I (1)
process) to mildly explosive behavior.
Our empirical strategy applies this procedure to data on real house prices to detect empirical evidence
of mildly explosive behavior, but exploits the possible disconnect between house prices and fundamentals
discussed in the context of (non-fundamental) rational bubbles for identication purposes. The house-price-
to-rent ratio is often used as an indicator of over or undervaluation of housing relative to the expenses of
renting. If this ratio deviates from its long-run average, it can be an indication that house prices have become
misaligned from fundamentals. Working with housing rents is not without its problems, as housing rents are
often measured with great error or not available at all.
Since housing rents are not readily available, we extend the present-value model in (5) with other economic
relationships that relate housing rents to a set of macroeconomic variables (fundamentals). We focus our
attention primarily on the demand-side of the housing market using in particular data on real disposable
income and on the house price to income ratio to investigate the dynamics and stochastic properties of
fundamentals in connection with our investigation of explosiveness in real house prices. The price-to-income
ratio is commonly used in the literature as well as the house price to rent ratio to assess whether house prices
are sustainable in the sense of being consistent with the economic fundamentals of the housing market.6
In exploring the dynamics of fundamentals we aim to shed light on the question of whether mildly
explosive behavior can be attributed to some extent to the behavior of fundamentals themselves or whether
it could be due to other factors such as unobserved fundamentals, the behavior of the discount rate, (non-
fundamental) rational bubbles, etc. In this regard, three observation qualications are in order to understand
the specication of the tests we perform and the identication implied by our results:
1. Non-fundamental explosive behavior can lead to a disconnect between the stochastic process for
fundamentals Ft and for house prices Pt, as illustrated by the (non-fundamental) rational bubbles literature.
However, explosive behavior in house prices can also be inherited from the fundamental process itself. Assume
that the fundamentals Ft = F t +B
F
t can be described by a random walk with drift term F

t and a bubble-






where F t is given by,
F t = 









6The house price to income ratio provides a metric of house prices relative to the ability of households to pay (see, e.g.,
Himmelberg et al. (2005) and Girouard et al. (2006)). In that way, it incorporates one the key determinants of the demand
for housing.
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= (1 + c)BFt ; 0 < c < r: (17)
The unique solution to house prices Pt corresponds to the fundamental value of housing P t in equation (8)







































The house price Pt in this example has a unit root from F t , but also inherits the explosiveness from the
bubble component BFt that has been added to the fundamentals Ft. The linear combination between the
house price Pt and fundamentals Ft given by Pt   1rFt is not stationary, but displays explosive behavior as
well.
In other words, if a bubble drives the process for the fundamentals Ft, then we would not expect a
similar disconnect between house prices and fundamentals to emerge as discussed in the presence of non-
fundamental rational bubbles. This illustration indicates that whenever data on fundamentals is observable,
then exploring the properties of the fundamental process can shed some light on the question of the source
of explosiveness. If we specialize the present-value model described to the case where housing rents Xt and
disposable income Yt are related, then looking at both the disposable income as well as the house price to
income ratio can help us in the identication and naturally we make that part of our empirical strategy.
However, the bubble component may arise also from through the unobserved fundamentals Ut. Even if we
nd a disconnect between housing rents or disposable income on one hand and house prices on the other,
we cannot truly rule out the possibility that the explosiveness may have been inherited from the unobserved
fundamentals.
2. Fundamentals Ft may generate observed run-up trajectories on house prices Pt that are non-explosive,
but need to be taken into account for identication. As an example, a random walk with drift as specied for
the fundamentals Ft in equation (13) whenever  = 1 can generate run-up periods in the trajectory of house
prices and fundamentals, if the variance of the innovation is small and the drift itself is positive and strong
enough. In this case, there is no disconnect between the dynamics of fundamentals and house prices. The
observation of a large appreciation and a subsequent fall in the time series, however, does not necessarily
reveal explosivenes as it can be attributed to the drift.
The run-up rate of growth in house prices coming from the drift is linear, while it is exponential in the
case of an explosive process satisfying the submartingale property specied in equation (11). This distinction
enables statistical inference to identify periods of explosive behavior whenever a non-negligible drift is present
in the data. We may consider more general specications as well in which the drift itself is not simply a
constant, but a function of time. In our empirical analysis, we include a constant in the specication of
the regression equations underlying our tests but also evaluate alternative specications of the drift with
a linear-time trend to account for the e¤ect of the drift on the dynamics of house prices and fundamentals
8
to avoid incorrectly attributing some of it to explosive behavior.
3. Time variation in the discount rate r can also lead to explosive behavior in the time series of house prices
Pt, even when fundamentals Ft remain non-explosive (either stationary or integrated). As an illustration,




Et [Pt+1 + Ft+1] ; (19)
and assume a random walk without drift for the fundamental process in (13), i.e.,





The trajectory of the discount rate can have an important e¤ect on the characteristics of the fundamental
price of housing implied by (19) and (20) even inducing explosive behavior and a disconnect with the
fundamentals. We illustrate this with a simple (deterministic) time-varying discount rate that captures a
gradual and anticipated decline in interest rates over a period of time, i.e.,7
1 + rt+s =
8><>:
1 + r0, for 0  s  k;
(1 + rt+s+1) g, for k + 1  s < k0;
1 + r, for s  k0;
(21)
where 0 < k < k0 < 1 denes the time window of decline for the discount rate, and g  1 determines the
gross rate of decline in (21). This interest rate specication collapses to the constant discount rate whenever
g = 1 and implies r0 > r whenever g > 1. In a stylized manner, the time-varying discount rate in (21)
captures the idea that declining rates were an important factor in the run-up of house prices leading to the
2008-09 global recession.









<1 to rule out non-fundamental
bubbles, the present value model for the price of housing derived in equation (19) under (20)   (21) has a
unique solution of the form,
Pt = P

t = t 1Ft; (22)
where t 1 is time-varying and obeys the following (deterministic) di¤erence equation,
(1 + rt) t 1 = (1 + t) : (23)
If we combine the solution in (22) with the specication of the fundamentals in (20), we derive the following











7The recursive representation of the discount rate is equivalent to the following alternative characterization,
1 + rt+s =
8<: 1 + r
0 = (1 + r) gk
0 k, for 0  s  k;
(1 + r) gk
0 s, for k + 1  s < k0;
1 + r, for s  k0:
9
which indicates the potential impact of time variation in the discount rate on the persistence and volatility
of house prices.8
In the constant discount rate case where g = 1, the unique solution implies t = 1r . In that case, house
prices inherit the unit root of the fundamentals and its volatility is that of the fundamentals scaled by the
constant discount rate. The solution in the general case where g > 1 can be characterized by backward
induction as follows: for s  k0, the unique solution corresponds to the case where the low discount rate
remains constant with t+s = 1r ; taking t+k0 =
1
r as given and using the specication of the discount rate
given in (21) and the di¤erence equation in (23), we recover t+k0 1, and this can be used to recover t+k0 2
similarly and so on until we recover the entire trajectory back to time t.9 However, there is time variation
in t during the period of declining interest rates and also during the preceding period as the decline is
anticipated. We show that such variation alone induces mildly explosive behavior and higher volatility in
house prices as well as a disconnect with the fundamentals Ft from t to t+k0. Figure 1 illustrates the impact
of the discount rate rt in (21) on the properties of the house price series Pt in (24) with a simple numerical
example setting r = 0:02, g = 1:0002774397, k0   k = 70, and 2 = 0:01.
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Model Simulation Results 
Gross Rate of Return,         Variance 
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SOURCE: authors' calculations. 
8For a discussion on the characteristics of the volatility process in house prices with data from the International House Price
Database, see for instance Mack and Martínez-García (2012). These authors provide some empirical evidence of an increase in
house price volatility that would be consistent as well with the stylized implications of declining discount rates laid out here.
9We can also show that the persistence term
t 1
t 2
in the house price equation in (24) is bounded below by g and above by
gk
0 k over the period from t up to t+ k0.
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We have discussed in sub-section 2.1 how rational bubbles can emerge when fundamentals are otherwise
an integrated process. If there is no evidence of explosive behavior in the fundamentals, real house prices
that display patterns of explosiveness could be driven by the non-fundamental (bubble) component of the
solution. However, even after controlling for house price run-ups induced by the drift component, testing
for explosiveness in fundamentals o¤ers only an incomplete picture of the disconnect between prices and
fundamentals as we suspect the presence of important unobserved fundamentals. Our ndings, therefore,
do not preclude the possibility that the explosiveness in house prices may be inherited from other unob-
served fundamentals.10 Moreover, an alternative interpretation based on a declining discount rate can also
rationalize the observed run-up in house prices, the explosiveness in the time series and the disconnect with
fundamentals without having to appeal to a rational bubble. While our empirical strategy focuses on real
house prices and their relationship to disposable income and housing a¤ordability (the house price to in-
come ratio), we take into consideration the potential impact of the discount rate also as a possibility in our
discussion of the identication and in setting the timeline of events for the 2008-09 global recession.
3 Testing for Explosive Behavior
Asset pricing theory suggests that the dynamics and stochastic properties of an observed asset price may be
indicative of the existence of explosive behavior. Departures from I (1) to mildly explosive behavior allows
to formulate statistical tests that can detect evidence of such explosiveness in the data. Diba and Grossman
(1988) provided one of the rst attempts to test it in the context of the stock market. The authors suggest
comparing stock prices and observable market fundamentals, using reduced form stationarity tests. The
rationale is that bubbles cannot be ruled out in the case that stock prices are found to be explosive when
market fundamentals are not. However, the presence of periodically collapsing bubbles (i.e., those that
emerge and burst at recurring times), a feature of actual stock price data, puts into question the power of
stationarity-based tests as indicated by Evans (1991). Evans (1991) showed using simulation methods that
standard unit root and cointegration tests cannot reject the null of no explosive behavior, when periodically
collapsing bubbles are present in the data.11
Based on a recursive and rolling right-tail variation of the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF )
unit root test, Phillips et al. (2011) with the supremum ADF (SADF ) and Phillips et al. (2012) and
Phillips et al. (2013) with the generalized SADF (GSADF ) have developed new detection strategies to
provide a better identication. These strategies enable us to detect mildly explosive behavior in the data and
to date-stamp their occurrence. These tests consider as a null hypothesis the unit root, while the alternative
is a mildly explosive process. Phillips et al. (2012), Phillips et al. (2012) and Phillips et al. (2013) show
how using recursive and rolling tests increases the power in the detection of explosiveness, as compared to
standard unit root tests on the whole sample.
10We note that, apart from income and rent, there are other fundamental drivers of housing prices, such as the cost of
foregone interest, the cost of property taxes and maintenance costs (see, e.g., the discussion in Himmelberg et al. (2005)).
Since explosive behavior in prices may be induced by these other fundamental drivers, the presence of explosive dynamics in
house-price-to-income and price-to-rent ratios cannot be considered conclusive of a disconnect or lack thereof between house
prices and fundamentals.
11Let us assume a large price increase develops during a period of explosive behavior. When the episode bursts, the price
tends to decline rapidly (but usually only for a short time period). The price increase followed by the decline makes the process
look like it mean reverts the process will not look explosive but, on the contrary, stationary. Intuitively, this is the reason why
many non-recursive unit root tests wrongly suggest that processes that incorporate periodically collapsing boom-bust episodes
are stationary the main point of the Evans (1991) paper.
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Phillips et al. (2012) and Phillips et al. (2013) nd that their strategy based on the GSADF test
outperforms that of the SADF test originally proposed in Phillips et al. (2011) in the presence of multiple
episodes of exuberance (explosive behavior). The ndings of Homm and Breitung (2012), using Monte Carlo
simulation, also support the view that the GSADF test strategy performs relatively well in the detection
of explosiveness when compared against standard time series tests for the detection of bubbles, particularly
when periodically occurring bubbles are present, and for real time monitoring.
We adopt these same procedures for testing and date-stamping, which will now be presented in brief, to
investigate the dynamics and stochastic properties of real house prices and some commonly observed housing
fundamentals.
3.1 The SADF and GSADF Procedures
The time series econometric method used for testing and detecting explosive behavior is based on the
following Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF ) regression equation,
yt = ar1;r2 + r1;r2yt 1 +
kX
i=1
 ir1;r2yt i + t; t
iid N(0; 2r1;r2); (25)
where yt denotes a time series process (in our case, real house prices, personal disposable income, or the
house price to income ratio), yt i for i = 1; :::; k are the di¤erenced lags of the time series, and t is the
error term. Moreover, k is the maximum number of lags included in the specication, r1 and r2 denote
fractions of the total sample size that specify the starting and ending points of a subsample period, ar1;r2
is the intercept, and  ir1;r2 for i = 1; :::; k are the coe¢ cients on the di¤erenced lags of the time series, and
r1;r2 is the coe¢ cient of interest in using the ADF regression equation for testing.
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As noted in the previous section, the emergence and popping of a bubble process fBtg1t=1 that satises
condition (11) is indicated by a shift from a random walk under the assumption that fundamentals are
I (1) to an explosive autoregressive process. Explosiveness in house prices can also be induced by time
variation in the discount rate in the context of the present value model of housing presented in equation
(5) and it would be indicated by a shift from a random walk to a mildly explosive autorregressive process
as well. Therefore, we are interested in testing with equation (25) the null hypothesis of a unit root,




denote the test statistic corresponding to this null hypothesis. It is easy to see that setting r1 = 0 and r2 = 1
yields the standard ADF test statistic, ADF 10 . The limit distribution of ADF
1






12While the intercept in the specication of the estimation regression, ar1;r2 , is constant we also evaluate an alternative where
it is replaced with a linear trend to account for the possibility that the underlying process driving the data has a time-varying
(though deterministic) trend component.
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where W is a Wiener process. The ADF test compares the ADF 10 statistic with the right tail critical value
from its limit distribution. When the test statistic exceeds the critical value, the unit root hypothesis is
rejected in favor of explosive behavior.
Although widely employed, the standard ADF test has extremely low power in detecting episodes of
explosive behavior when these episodes end with a large drop in prices, i.e. in the presence of boom-bust
dynamics. Nonlinear dynamics, such as those displayed by periodically collapsing bubbles, frequently lead
to nding spurious stationarity even though the process is inherently explosive as noted by Evans (1991).
In order to deal with the e¤ect of a price collapse on the tests performance, Phillips et al. (2011) proposed
a recursive procedure based on the estimation of the ADF regression on subsamples of the data. Detection
of mildly explosive behavior is reduced to testing for a change from I (1) to explosive in a univariate time
series, where the change point is unknown. In particular, normalizing the end of the original sample to
T = 1, the authors propose estimating (25) using a forward expanding sample with the end of the sample
period r2 increasing from r0 (the minimum window size for the xed initial window) to one (the last available
observation). In this procedure, the beginning of the sample is held constant at r1 = 0, and the expanding
window size of the regression (over the normalized sample) is denoted by rw = r2   r1.
Figure 2 illustrates the nature of the estimation procedure proposed by Phillips et al. (2011): The rst
observation in the sample is the starting point of the estimation window (i.e., r1 = 0) and the end point
of the initial estimation window, r2, is set to ensure a minimum window size of r0 (so rw = r0 = r2 for
the initial estimation). Then, while the starting point of the estimation is kept xed at r1 = 0, the test
regression is recursively estimated, while incrementing the window size, r2 2 [r0; 1], by adding one additional
observation at a time. Each estimation yields an ADF statistic denoted as ADF r20 .
Figure 2: SADF: Illustration of the Rolling Window Procedure






The test statistic, called sup ADF (SADF ), is dened as the supremum value of the ADF r20 sequence
expressed as follows,
SADF (r0) = sup
r22[r0;1]
ADF r20 : (28)
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Similarly to the standard ADF test, when the SADF statistic exceeds the right tailed critical value from
its limit distribution, the unit root hypothesis is rejected in favor of explosive behavior.
The SADF test performs well when there is a single boom-bust episode in the time series. Simulation
experiments in Homm and Breitung (2012) reveal that the SADF outperforms alternative methods, such as
the modied Bhargava (1986), the modied Busetti and Taylor (2004), and the modied Kim (2000) (with
the corrections of Kim et al. (2002)), in terms of power. These approaches are used to test a permanent
change in persistence from a random walk to an explosive process. As a consequence, they perform well only
in the case that a bubble develops but never bursts. In the presence of periodically collapsing bubbles they
exhibit very low power, they are inconsistent, and are outperformed by the SADF .13
More recently, Phillips et al. (2012) and Phillips et al. (2013) derived a new unit root test, the Generalized
SADF (GSADF ), that covers a larger number of subsamples than the SADF by allowing both the ending
point, r2, and the starting point, r1, to change. This extra exibility on the estimation windows illustrated
in 3 results in substantial power gains in comparison to the SADF . Moreover, the test is consistent with
multiple boom-bust episodes within a given time series.














𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤= 𝑟𝑟1 − 𝑟𝑟1 
𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤= 𝑟𝑟1 − 𝑟𝑟1 
𝑟𝑟2 
𝑟𝑟2 
The GSADF statistic is dened by,
GSADF (r0) = sup
r22[r0;1];r12[0;r2 r0]
ADF r2r1 : (30)
13These test procedures were proposed to test for a change in persistence between I (0) and I (1). In the simulations of Homm
and Breitung (2012), Chow-type break test is also considered. The Chow-type test often exhibits the highest power in their
estimations and its estimators for the unknown break date tend to be most reliable in nite samples.
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where, again, the window size of each estimation is rw = r2   r1. Rejection of the unit root hypothesis in
favor of explosive behavior requires that the test statistic exceeds the right tailed critical value from its limit
distribution given by (31).
3.2 The Date-Stamping Strategy
In many cases, it is of prime interest to detect the period(s) that display explosive dynamics. Moreover, it is
important for policy formation and monitoring purposes to examine whether the time series is currently in
an explosive regime or not. The SADF and GSADF test procedures also deliver, under general regularity
conditions, a date-stamping strategy to consistently estimate the beginning and end of periods of mildly
explosive behavior often referred to as periods of exuberance when the underlying time series is on the
upswing. If the null hypothesis of either of these tests is rejected, then one can infer the start and end
times of such episodes of exuberance the implementation of the date-stamping procedure, however, di¤ers
depending on whether we use the SADF or GSDAF approach.
The date-stamping strategy proposed by Phillips et al. (2011) under the SADF approach compares each
element of the estimated ADF r20 sequence against the corresponding right-tailed critical value of the standard
ADF statistic. The beginning of the period of exuberance corresponds to the rst observation, denoted Tre ,
for which the ADF r20 statistics crosses the corresponding critical value from below. Analogously, the end of
the period of exuberance, denoted Trr , is dated from the rst observation after Tre for which the ADF
r2
0
statistics crosses the corresponding critical value from above. The estimates of the beginning and end of the





















where scubr2Tc is the 100 (1  ) % critical value of the standard ADF statistic based on br2T c observations.
In applied work it is standard to set  to 5%, but we also consider statistical signicance at the 1% and 10%
levels.
Under the GSDAF approach proposed by Phillips et al. (2012) and Phillips et al. (2013), the rst step
of the date-stamping procedure is to test the unit root hypothesis by comparing the GSADF (r0) to the
1  critical value, where  is the nominal signicance level as before. Statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels is conventionally reported. Suppose that the GSADF test rejects the null hypothesis of a
unit root. Hence, the second step of the procedure is to identify period(s) of explosive behavior if GSADF
test rejects the null.





SADF r2r1 : (34)
The authors dene the origination date of the period of exuberance as the rst observation that the BSADF
statistic exceeds its critical value,
bre = inf
r22[r0;1]
fr2 : BSADFr2(r0) > scubr2Tcg; (35)
and the termination date as the rst observation after bre for which the BSADF falls below its critical value,
brf = inf
r22[bre;1]fr2 : BSADFr2(r0) < scubr2Tcg; (36)
where scubr2Tc is the 100 (1  ) % critical value of the sup ADF based on br2T c observations and  is
the chosen signicance level. When the BSADF statistic exceeds the nite-sample critical values of the
SADF , we argue that the empirical evidence suggests that the time series displays explosive behavior. The
consistency of the above dating strategy in the presence of one or two periodically collapsing bubbles is
established in Phillips et al. (2012).
Because the distributions of the SADF (r0) in (28) and GSADF (r0) in (34) are non-standard, critical
values have to be obtained through Monte Carlo simulations. The Monte Carlo procedure consists of the
following steps:
1. Generate a driftless random walk series of size T .
2. Estimate equation (25) using least squares and compute the SADF and GSADF statistics.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 a large number of times, say 2000, to obtain the distribution of the SADF and
GSADF statistics.
4. The 100 (1  ) % critical value of each test statistic is given by the 100 (1  ) percentile of the
corresponding distribution obtained in step 3.
The researcher may choose to neglect very short periods of exuberance by setting a minimum duration
period. The researcher may also decide to combine adjacent periods of exuberance by setting a minimum
duration period to elapse between any two consecutive periods of exuberance to be treated as separate.
Phillips et al. (2013) recommend that we dene log (T ) =T as a minimal interval for date-stamping a period
of mildly explosive in a time series, which we apply also to set the minimum length of periods in between
two consecutive episodes. Since all our time series have 154 quarterly observations, the minimum interval
that we adhere to in our empirical evaluation corresponds to 5 quarters.
3.3 Other Technical Details
The computation of the SADF , GSADF and BSADF test statistics necessitates the selection of the
minimum window size r0 and the autoregressive lag length k. Regarding the minimum window size, this
has to be large enough to allow initial estimation but it should not be too large to avoid missing short
14The backwward sup ADF (BSADF ) statistic relates to the GSADF statistic as follows,




episodes of exuberance. We follow Phillips et al. (2012) and set the minimum size equal to 36 observations.
Exploring alternative minimum window sizes can be computationally demanding since for each r0 we have
to compute new critical values, and for this paper changes in r0 within the neighborhood of 36 seem to make
little di¤erence on our ndings.
With respect to the autoregressive lag length k, we evaluate our results primarily for two cases, k equal to
1 and 4. Our results do not appear very sensitive sensitive to a xed lag specication when we allow for fewer
than 4 lags. Hence, our ndings in the remainder of the paper will be reported only for the case of lag length
set at k = 4, unless otherwise noted, to save space. The choice of a xed lag length is appealing because it
allows us to employ a recursive least squares approach which reduces substantially the computational cost
of estimation.
More sophisticated lag length selection procedures in ADF-type tests based on information criteria (such
as the Modied Information Criteria of Ng and Perron (2001)) and sequential hypothesis testing (see, e.g.,
Ng and Perron (1995)) could, in principle, be applied but with a higher computational cost. Phillips et al.
(2012) show that sequential hypothesis testing for the determination of the lag length can result in severe size
distortions, and a reduction in power of both the SADF and GSADF tests. That is, SADF and GSADF
tests based on sequential hypothesis testing perform poorly, frequently rejecting the null hypothesis when the
data follow a unit root process, and failing to reject the null when there is explosiveness in the time series.
Nonetheless, we consider for the paper the lag selection criteria (using the Modied Akaike Information
Criterion) with up to 4 lags as a robustness check and, once again, our results (not reported) do not appear
very sensitive to the lag specication in this case.
The implementation of the unit root tests also requires the limit distributions of the SADF , GSADF
and BSADF test statistics. These distributions are non-standard and depend on the minimum window
size. Hence, critical values have to be obtained through Monte Carlo simulations. We obtain nite sample
critical values by generating 2; 000 and up to 20; 000 robustness replications of a random walk process
with N(0; 1) errors. Asymptotic SADF and GSADF critical values are provided in Phillips et al. (2012)
Table 1. Although it is preferred to use nite-sample critical values when sample size is relatively small,
using asymptotic critical values doesnt change qualitatively our results.
4 Empirical Evidence on International House Prices
A novel dataset on house prices and personal disposable income per capita from the International House
Price Database of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas is studied in the empirical work that we report here.
The sources and methodology used to construct this panel of 22 countries are documented in Mack and
Martínez-García (2011).15 The data on real house prices and real personal disposable income per capita is
reported quarterly, deated with the PCE deator, and covers the period from the rst quarter of 1975 to
the second quarter of 2013. We construct an a¤ordability index for housing as the ratio (in percent) of real
house prices over real personal disposable income per capita for each country.
15See the Appendix for a description of the data sources on house prices.
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The sample period covered in this database includes several prior recessions, which makes it ideal for us
to contrast the timeline of the boom and bust in international housing markets prior to the 2008-09 global
recession against other periods of contraction in economic activity. Longer time series may be available for
some countries, but the empirical ndings reported here are generally robust. The median, lower and upper
quartile of the time series of all 22 countries are displayed for illustration in Figure 4. We observe that for
the median country, real house prices troughed in the mid-1990s and peaked around 2006. This run-up in
real house prices appears widespread, which has fueled the view that this episode of housing exuberance
had a part in the subsequent 2008-09 global recession. Our paper provides empirical evidence to partly
substantiate the claim of exuberance in house prices, but also provides a time line of events and shows that
there is less of a common pattern in the cross-country data that meets the eye.
For all these countries, we investigate the explosive behavior of real house prices, the price-to-income
ratio and real personal disposable income per capita (PDI). The ratio of real house prices to real personal
disposable income is a long-run anchor in the determination of house prices. The median, upper and lower
quartiles of the price-to-income ratio, as well as the real PDI, are plotted in Figure 5. While the price-to-
income ratio exhibits a timeline similar to that of real house prices a boom period during the late 1990s
and the rst half of the 2000s, followed by a severe correction afterwards the pattern of the real PDI does
not suggest a clear connection with prices.
4.1 Empirical Findings: A Timeline of Periods of Exuberance in International
Housing Markets
Table 2, included in Appendix B, reports results for real house prices, the price-to-income ratio, and the real
PDI for each of the 22 countries covered in the International House Price Database. With the SADF test
statistics of Phillips et al. (2011), we cannot reject the null on real house prices for 11 out of the 22 countries
at conventional signicance levels. The evidence is even weaker when we look at the price-to-income ratio
and the real PDI, as fewer countries show evidence of explosive behavior in the time series according to this
test.
We adopt the GSADF procedure of Phillips et al. (2012) and Phillips et al. (2013) as our primary
tool for testing and date-stamping periods of exuberance in international housing markets. The GSADF
procedure is expected to have higher power than the SADF test whenever there are periodically collapsing
explosive dynamics within sample.
The GSADF statistics, reported in Table 2, o¤ers strong evidence of exuberance in real house prices
for all countries except three (Finland, Italy, and South Korea). Hence, our results indicate that periods of
explosive behavior were widespread across a large number of countries given our available time series. The
evidence for mildly explosive behavior is equally robust when we look at the price-to-income ratio, except
for Norway, for which we cannot reject the null. When we apply the same testing procedure to the real PDI
series, we fail to nd evidence of explosive behavior at conventional statistical signicance levels for 4 out of
the 22 countries (Germany, Denmark, France, and New Zealand), but the timeline of these episodes suggests
a disconnect between periods of exuberance in housing markets and the observable fundamental factors (real
PDI) driving the demand for housing.
Figure 6 and Figure 7 complete the description of the results derived with the procedure of Phillips et al.
(2012) and Phillips et al. (2013) by plotting the periods of exuberance for all countries in the database and
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for all three series of interest (real house prices, price-to-income ratios, and real PDI). As before, we identify
periods of explosiveness by comparing the time evolution of the BSADF statistics for each series against
the 95% GSDAF critical value sequence in nite-samples.
We include in Figure 6 two subplots for real house prices (top) and the house-price-to-income ratio
(bottom). We observe that for the most part there is accordance between the periods of exuberance detected
with these two variables. However, it is worth pointing out, that periods of explosiveness based on non-
fundamental behavior detected by the house-price-to-income ratio tend to be somewhat shorter than those
we see with the real house price data. Three phases can be identied from this graph in connection with
the last boom and bust episode in international housing markets. According to our evidence, each phase
involves a specic evolution of the episode.
In the rst phase, between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s, explosiveness appears in the U.S. and
Ireland. There were concurrent episodes detected for Norway and Switzerland at the time, but those seemed
to have evolved and eventually collapsed on their own. The leading role of the U.S. during this phase
completely disappears if we look at the price-to-income ratio. The following hypothesis is central for our
interpretation of the timeline of events: That explosiveness in house prices may have originally been driven
by fundamentals in the U.S. The 1990s was a period of strong growth in income, partly due to the impact
of the new information technologies.
We include in Figure 7 two subplots for real house prices (top) and the real PDI (bottom). We observe
evidence of explosiveness in the real PDI during the rst phase, but not in the case of the U.S. The robust
upward trend of real PDI can explain the more muted picture of exuberance in the U.S. housing market than
we get from the price-to-income ratio, but as we argue in the preceding section, there are other factors that
can explain explosiveness in the U.S. real house prices, other than the characteristics of the fundamentals.
Our evidence, therefore, does not allow us to rule out the possibility of other unobserved fundamentals played
a major role in the origination of the boom, or even to rule the possibility of bubbles.
Furthermore, there is an unusual synchronization in the episodes of explosive behavior across most of
the countries in the sample since the early-to-mid 2000s. This period of near simultaneous exuberance was
pervasive across very di¤erent housing markets whose fundamentals where not necessarily aligned, and it
is unprecedented with the sample covered within the International House Price Database. This constitutes
the second phase of the boom period, that eventually collapsed before the start of the 2008-09 global
recession. While di¤erences in the timeline for each country vary depending on whether we look at episodes
of exuberance on real house prices or the price-to-income ratio, there is a broad synchronization during this
second phase with both variables.
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NOTE: Shaded areas indicate periods of exuberance determined by the GSADF test. 
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NOTE: Shaded areas indicate periods of exuberance determined by the GSADF test. Real PDI exuberance measure includes a linear time trend. 























'85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '10
Real House Price Index 
21
The evidence of exuberance in the real PDI is signicantly di¤erent with very few countries showing
a pattern of explosiveness that could account for the behavior of house prices during this second phase.
Spain and the U.K. stand out as two of the major economies in the narrative of the boom and bust of
housing markets whose distinct experiences are illustrative of the second phase. In both cases, we document
a signicant disconnect between this particular fundamental and the behavior of house prices in countries
such as Spain and the U.K., a period of explosiveness in income arises only after the correction in housing
markets takes place. We will look at both countrys experiences compared against the U.S. in closer inspection
later on.
During the second phase, the boom in house prices that originated in the U.S., propagated to other
housing markets with perceived greater opportunities or lower risks. Our evidence on the real PDI does not
rule out a contribution from fundamentals, but the pattern of propagation and the high synchronization
observed in real house prices suggest that a common factor may have contributed to house price exuberance
spreading to other countries. In this regard, the decline in world interest rates experienced during the 2000s
may have been an important contributing factor, as suggested in Section 2.2 by theory. Figure 1 illustrates
the potential impact of time variation in the discount rate rt in (21) on the features of the house price
series Pt in (24) indicating that explosiveness in house prices due to declines in the discount rate may be
associated with higher volatility as well. Mack and Martínez-García (2012) provide some corroborating
empirical evidence as they detect (with essentially the same dataset) an increase in house price volatility
during this phase that would be consistent with the stylized implications of a declining discount rate.
In the third and nal phase, the run-up in house prices started to be perceived as not sustainable, and
risks to real economic activity in both the U.S. and around the world grew. The episode ended in a near
simultaneous collapse of house prices around 2005-06, and then the economic implications for the U.S. and
the world became apparent.
These three phases provide a timeline for the boom and bust in international housing markets that
preceded the 2008-09 global recession. We identify periods of mildly explosive behavior in house prices for
each country, and investigate the contribution of fundamentals (real PDI) as well. While our evidence does
not rule out the possibility that housing fundamentals would be the main driver, pinning down the sources
of the observed behavior is more complicated. The strong run-up in income during the 1990s may have
contributed to the overheating in the U.S. housing market, but non-fundamental bubbles or the behavior of
unobserved fundamentals could have also contributed. The pattern of propagation that we observe across
housing markets during the second phase could also be consistent with a period of decline in world interest
rates.
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4.2 Empirical Findings: The Cases of the U.S., the U.K., and Spain
We highlight the experiences of the U.S., the U.K., and Spain for the period between the rst quarter of
1975 and the second quarter of 2013 for their economic size and signicance, and because they describe
the distinct patterns observed during the three main phases of the timeline of events that we describe in the
paper.
The real house price appreciation has been very signicant for these three countries since the mid 1980s.
The time series shows that the real house price run-up seen in the U.K. and Spain has been larger over time
than that experienced in the U.S. This sets Spain and the U.K. apart, but as our evidence shows, it does
not mean that explosive behavior is somehow weaker for the U.S. In fact, during the period of exuberance
leading to the 2008-09 global recession, the U.S. played the leading role, while the U.K. and Spain lagged.
Interestingly, the di¤erences between the U.K. and Spain become more noticeable when we look at the
price-to-income ratio and the real PDI data. The price-to-income ratio during the 1990s reverted back to
its pre-1985 average for the U.K., but remained elevated for Spain. Spains correction since 2006 has been
more severe than that of the U.K., whose price-to-income ratio has remained elevated since the mid-2000s
in spite of experiencing a housing bust. The time series also shows that growth in real PDI was consistently
more robust for the U.K. than for Spain since the mid-1990s.
In spite of these di¤erences, our ndings show that both countries went through a simultaneous period
of exuberance during the second phase of the timeline. While country specic di¤erences play a distinctive
role for both countries, there is still a pattern of propagation that we observe, where explosiveness in real
house prices in the U.S. may have migrated and amplied the e¤ect of domestic factors in these very di¤erent
housing markets.
Table 1: Evidence of Explosive Behavior in the Housing Markets
Panel A: Test Statistics
Real House Prices Price-to-Income Ratio Real PDI
Country SADF GSADF SADF GSADF SADF GSADF
United States 1:52 3:81  0:78 3:47  1:15 1:30
United Kingdom 1:83 3:34 1:50 2:65  0:34 1:31
Spain 0:39 3:34 0:01 1:84 1:39 1:77
Panel B: Critical Values
90% 0:98 1:54 0:98 1:54 0:12 0:71
95% 1:25 1:80 1:25 1:80 0:39 0:95
99% 1:89 2:39 1:89 2:39 0:91 1:43
Note: *, **, and ***, denote statistical signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent signicance level respectively. All results are for
autoregressive lag length k=4. The estimates for Real Personal Disposable Income (PDI) are based on a estimation regression
that includes a linear time trend.
The top panel of Table 1 summarizes the estimated SADF and GSADF test statistics for the U.S., the
U.K., and Spain on the three variables of interest: Real house prices, the price-to-income ratio and real PDI.
The bottom panel of Table 1 reports the 90%, 95% and 99% critical values for the SADF and GSADF
statistics.
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Focusing on real house prices, we observe that the SADF test statistics are greater than the 95% critical
values for the U.S. and the U.K. but not for Spain. Further, the GSADF statistics for all three countries
are greater than the 99% critical values in accordance with the higher power of the GSADF test. Overall,
there is strong evidence that real house prices have exhibited periods of explosive behavior in the given time
series of these three countries.
Table 1 also reports results for price-to-income ratios and real PDI from the International House Price
Database for the same set of countries. What we observe with the price-to-income ratio is similar to the
evidence on real house prices. The GSADF statistics for house price to income ratio is above the 99% critical
value for the U.S. and the U.K., and above the 95% critical value for Spain. Hence, the evidence from this
ratio seems to corroborate that these three countries have all experienced periods of explosive behavior. The
GSADF statistics for real PDI are statistically signicant at the conventional 95% level for the U.S. and
the U.K. and at the 99% level for Spain. We interpret this as evidence that domestic fundamental factors
may exhibit explosiveness, but cannot conclude that they have played a role in supporting this period of
exuberance in housing markets.
Having established that there is strong empirical support for explosiveness in real house prices, the next
step of the procedure of Phillips et al. (2012) and Phillips et al. (2013) is to identify the actual period(s) of
explosive behavior in the time series which we do next.
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United States Figures 8, 9 and 10 display our main results for the U.S. In the top panel, we observe the
respective time series of all three variables examined (real house prices, house-price-to-income ratio and real
PDI). The bottom panel shows the time evolution of the BSADF statistics for real house prices, house-
price-to-income ratios and real PDI respectively together with the 95% GSADF critical value sequence (in
nite-samples).
We see that real house prices for the U.S. entered an explosive regime around the second half of the
mid-1990s until 2006. With the long-run anchor of the house-price-to-income ratio, we observe a period of
exuberance that tends to be shorter and coincides with the second phase of the timeline described in the
paper. The evidence for real PDI does not show a distinct pattern of explosiveness in the data prior to the
collapse of real house prices documented in 2006, once we account for the trend component in the series.
Our ndings signal a period of explosive behavior occurring in the U.S. since the mid-1990s that may have
multiple causes, but may have been partly supported and partly masked by the strong growth in income
experienced at the same time.
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United Kingdom Figures 11, 12 and 13 display our main results for the U.K. The interpretation of these
gures is analogous to those of the U.S. The U.K. displays an additional episode of explosive behavior in
the late 1980s when looking at real house prices and the price-to-income ratio, although not seen in the real
PDI data. We observe that the periods of exuberance are aligned whether we look at real house prices or
the house-price-to-income ratio. These ndings point towards a period of exuberance in house prices during
the rst half of the 2000s that corresponds to the second phase of our timeline. But once again, it does not
overlap with explosiveness in income, as measured by the real PDI. The strength of income growth since the
mid-1980s in the U.K. may have played a similar role as in the case of the U.S., but the evidence suggests
that this was not enough to insulate the housing market from a period of exuberance preceding the bust in
2007-08.
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Spain Figures 14, 15 and 16 display our main results for Spain. Once again, the interpretation of these
gures is the same as for the U.S. The rapid acceleration of house prices was not driven by explosive behavior
except for a period of exuberance in the rst half of the 2000s. The house-price-to-income ratio tends to give
us a shorter period of exuberance for the latest boom-bust episode in the Spanish housing market, suggesting
that part of the appreciation could be due to the behavior of fundamentals. When we look at the evidence on
explosiveness in the real PDI series for Spain, it appears as statistically signicant at conventional condence
levels, following the correction of housing prices in 2006-07. Once again, our results point to a disconnect
between the behavior of house prices and that of income during this boom and bust cycle.
However, in the case of Spain, the collapse in the housing market may have contributed to the behavior of
the real PDI series since 2008. We also observe that there is some evidence of explosive behavior in real PDI
in the second half of the 1980s a period that coincided with Spains accession into the present-day European
Union, but before the collapse of the European Monetary System in 1992-93 and the severe recession that
a¤ected the country in the early 1990s. We nd during that time no evidence of explosiveness in house prices
that may have either triggered or been induced by the behavior of real PDI, indicating again a disconnect
between them.
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In this paper we describe a novel test (GSADF ) proposed by Phillips et al. (2012) and Phillips et al. (2013)
applied to house price data from the International House Price Database of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas documented in Mack and Martínez-García (2011). We show that this test is useful for detecting
and date-stamping periods of explosive behavior in housing markets, and more broadly to monitor the
macroeconomic developments in housing.
We cannot attribute our ndings to the observable fundamentals (real personal disposable income per
capita) for most countries. However, a timeline of events that emerges from the empirical evidence suggests
that the latest boom-bust cycle in international housing markets evolved in three phases: One of origination
that can be identied with the U.S. experience primarily during the second half of the 1990s; a second
phase of propagation that is characterized by widespread and synchronized episodes of exuberance across
very di¤erent housing markets during the rst half of the 2000s; and a nal phase where this episode of
exuberance bursts within a short period of time for the a¤ected countries preceding the severe contraction
in economic activity of the 2008-09 global recession.
If the discount rate is time invariant, the identication of explosive characteristics in the house price data
is observationally equivalent to the detection of a rational bubble (see, e.g., Diba and Grossman (1988)),
and theory suggests this could also be a propagating factor during the second phase described in this paper
that can also explain the increase in volatility documented by Mack and Martínez-García (2012). Otherwise,
unobserved fundamentals or even non-fundamental rational bubbles may have played a role in the observed
behavior of house prices and the apparent disconnect that we document here with the behavior of the real
PDI (as a key determinant of the demand for housing).
We pay special attention to the cases of the U.S., the U.K., and Spain, which were greatly a¤ected by the
latest boom and bust in the housing markets. Our evidence suggests that even controlling for fundamental
behavior, there is strong evidence that explosive behavior appeared in the U.S. in the second half of the
1990s and followed in the U.K. and Spain during the rst half of the 2000s. This evidence contrasts with
existing work that employs other more conventional methods of bubble-detection which produce less clear
readings. Our results show that the cases of the U.S., the U.K. and Spain were far from isolated. In fact,
they were fairly typical of a period of exuberance that a¤ected most of the countries covered currently in
the International House Price Database. The correction of such a widespread period of explosive behavior
resulted in the most severe recession of the post-WWII period for most of them.
Our work also shows how this methodology can be implemented to detect the presence of explosive
behavior that are not identiable with other existing methodologies. As a result, we view this procedure as a




A Demand Equation for Rental Housing
Consider the maximization of the Stone-Geary utility function with housing units rented, Ht, and consump-
tion of other goods, Ct, i.e.,16
U (Ht; Ct) = (Ht   H) (Ct   C)1  ; 0 <  < 1;
subject to the intratemporal budget constraint,
Ct + xtHt = Yt;
where the price of the consumption good is normalized to one. Xt  xtHt is the housing rents rental
expenditures paid and xt the rental rate per unit rented, Yt refers to disposable income, while 0 <  < 1,
H and C are preference parameters.
From rst-order conditions, the Stone-Geary utility function subject to the standard intratemporal budget
constraint gives a linear expenditure system where the demand for rental housing takes the following form,
Ht = H +

xt
(Yt   xtH   C) ; (37)
or in expenditure terms,
Xt  xtHt = Yt + (1  ) Hxt   C : (38)
Under the assumption that in equilibrium the units rented are constant (i.e., Ht = H) and normalized to one,
the demand equation that determines housing rents in (38) reduces to an a¢ ne transformation of disposable
income Yt, i.e.,
Xt = xt =  + Yt+1; (39)
where   1 (1 )H and     1 (1 )H C .
16While the Stone-Geary reduces to the Cobb-Douglas utility function whenever the parameters H and C are both set equal
to zero, the specication permits both the rental rate elasticity and the income elasticity to vary with both rental rates and
income unlike the Cobb-Douglas where both elasticities are constant or the constant elasticity of substitution utility function
for which the income elasticity is constant.
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B SADF and GSADF Statistics for All Countries in the Database
Table 2: Evidence of Explosive Behavior in the Housing Markets
Panel A: Test Statistics
Real House Prices Price-to-Income Ratio Real PDI
Country SADF GSADF SADF GSADF SADF GSADF
Australia 2:23 6:18 1:08 2:57 1:02 1:07
Belgium 0:97 2:98  0:25 2:92 0:93 1:06
Canada 0:32 3:76  1:13 2:16  0:30 1:25
Switzerland 1:64 2:55 1:20 2:30  0:09 0:72
Germany  0:59 2:10 0:57 2:55  1:08  0:07
Denmark 1:31 3:00  0:03 2:15  0:32 0:54
Spain 0:39 3:34 0:01 1:84 1:39 1:77
Finland 0:94 1:45  0:89 0:96 0:17 1:81
France 1:35 2:21  0:03 2:46  0:46 0:50
United Kingdom 1:83 3:34 1:50 2:65  0:34 1:31
Ireland 2:59 3:71 2:01 2:19 2:41 3:92
Italy  1:28  0:31  1:52 1:08 0:18 1:54
Japan 1:67 3:77 0:88 4:63 1:27 1:37
South Korea  0:60  0:32 0:50 0:50  0:48 1:64
Luxembourg 1:66 3:89  0:27 1:59 0:95 1:34
Netherlands  0:43 4:13  0:17 3:13  0:49 0:74
Norway 0:85 1:75 0:22 0:36 0:59 1:06
New Zealand 1:77 2:35 0:43 3:19  0:61 0:31
Sweden 0:19 3:79 0:30 3:34  0:44 1:93
United States 1:52 3:81  0:78 3:47  1:15 1:30
South Africa  0:52 3:93  0:78 3:44 0:43 1:88
Croatia 0:08 1:46 0:87 3:52 2:90 3:33
Panel B: Critical Values
90% 0:98 1:54 0:98 1:54 0:12 0:71
95% 1:25 1:80 1:25 1:80 0:39 0:95
99% 1:89 2:39 1:89 2:39 0:91 1:43
Note: *, **, and ***, denote statistical signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent signicance level respectively. All results are for
autoregressive lag length k=4. The estimates for Real Personal Disposable Income (PDI) are based on a estimation regression
that includes a linear time trend.
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C National Sources of House Price Data
House Price Definition Source and Time Coverage
Australia Weighted average of 8 capital cities, new and
existing detached house price index, per dwelling
Australia Bureau of Statistics
1986Q3-present
Weighted average of 6 capital cities, new and
existing dwelling price index, per dwelling
Australian Treasury
1960Q3-present
Belgium Nationwide existing single-family
house price index, per dwelling
Statistics Belgium
1973Q1-present
Canada 10 metropolitan areas, “fair” price of existing




10 metropolitan areas, “fair” price of existing
detached bungalows and two story executive
dwellings, per dwelling
University of British Columbia
1975Q1-2012Q1
Switzerland Nationwide new and existing
single-family house price index, per dwelling
Swiss National Bank
1970Q1-present












Denmark Nationwide new and existing single-family house
price index, per dwelling
Statistics Denmark
1992Q1-present
Nationwide new and existing single-family house
price index, per dwelling
Danmarks Nationalbank
1971Q1-present




Nationwide average price of new and
existing dwellings, per square meter
Ministerio de la Vivienda
1987Q1-2004Q4




Finland Nationwide existing single-family
house price index, per square meter
Statistics Finland
1985Q1-present




France Nationwide existing detached house
and apartment price index, per dwelling
INSEE
1996Q1-present
Nationwide existing apartment price index,
per dwelling
CEGDD - Ministère de l’Écologie
1936-2009 (annual)
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House Price Definition Source and Time Coverage
United Kingdom Nationwide new and existing dwelling








Nationwide average price of new dwellings, per
square meter
Croatian Bureau of National
Statistics, 1965-2011 (annual)




Nationwide average price of existing dwellings,
per dwelling
Department of Environment,
Community & Local Government
1978Q1-present
Nationwide average price of existing dwellings,
per dwelling
Department of Environment,
Community & Local Government
1974-2009 (annual)
Italy 13 main metropolitan area average price of
new and existing dwellings, per square meter
Nomisma
1988S1-present
13 main metropolitan area average price
of new dwellings, per square meter
Il Consulente Immobiliare
1967-2001 (bi-annual)
Japan Nationwide urban residential land price index,
per square meter
Japan Real Estate Institute
1955S1-present
South Korea Nationwide new and existing dwelling
price index, per dwelling
Kookmin Bank
1986M1-present
Kyung-Hwan Kim (1993) index:








- Nationwide weighted average of total factor costs
single-family house and apartment construction
Korea Housing Bank
1974-1977 (annual)
Luxembourg Nationwide new and existing house
price index, per dwelling
L’Observatoire de l’Habitat
2005Q1-present
Nationwide new and existing dwelling
price index, per dwelling
Banque centrale du Luxembourg
1974-2009 (annual)
Netherlands Nationwide existing single-family
house price index, per dwelling
Statistics Netherlands
1995M1-present





Norway Nationwide new and existing detached
house price index, per dwelling
Statistics Norway
1992Q1-present
Norges Bank forecasting model index:
- Nationwide sales reports of Norges
Eindomsmeglerforbund real estate agents
Norges Eindomsmeglerforbund
1987Q1-2003Q4




- Nationwide building cost index Statistics Norway
1979Q1-1983Q4




New Zealand Nationwide new and existing detached
house price index, per dwelling
Reserve Bank of New Zealand
1962Q2-present
Sweden Nationwide new and existing one- and
two-family house price index, per dwelling
Statistics Sweden
1986Q1-present
Nationwide new and existing one- and
two-family house price index, per dwelling
Statistics Sweden
1975-2010 (annual)
United States Nationwide existing single-family
house price index, per dwelling
FHFA
1975Q1-present
South Africa Nationwide new and existing single-family
house price index, per dwelling
ABSA
1966M1-present
Note: Time series backcasting is used to extend the house price indexes of Spain and the Netherlands from the first
quarter of 1976 back to the first quarter of 1975. Time series nowcasting is used for Italy, Germany and Japan in
order to complete the quarterly dataset and avoid long lags in its public release. Nowcasting are subsequently
replaced with actual data from the national sources, as it becomes available.
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